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AbstrAct: This article describes and 
analyses the regulatory frameworks 
and the current pluralism protec-
tion policies in the United States and 
several countries of the European 
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Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and 
Resumen: Este texto describe y analiza 
el marco reglamentario y la política 
actual de protección del pluralismo 
en Estados Unidos y en diversos paí-
ses de la Unión Europea (Alemania, 
Francia, Reino Unido, Holanda, Ita-
lia y España). Los datos obtenidos 
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Spain). The data obtained allowed a 
qualitative assessment to be carried 
out, through a comparative analysis, 
in order to identify certain similari-
ties and some significant differenc-
es. Thus, it was found that pluralism 
protection is a common denomina-
tor in the communication policies of 
these countries. However, regulato-
ry and legislative differences depend 
on social, geographical and media 
contexts, and time variations in the 
application of policies depend on 
audiovisual media market liberalisa-
tion processes.
Keywords: Communication policies, 
pluralism, audience concentration, 
United States, European Union.
permiten plantear una valoración 
cualitativa, gracias al análisis com-
parativo, donde se identifican ciertas 
semejanzas y también algunas difer-
encias significativas. Así, se observa 
que la protección del pluralismo es 
un referente común en las políticas 
de comunicación de estos países. No 
obstante, el marco reglamentario 
y normativo presenta diferencias, 
según el contexto social, geográfico 
y comunicativo, y la aplicación de di-
chas políticas presenta variaciones 
temporales en función del proceso 
de liberalización del mercado audio-
visual.
Palabras clave: políticas de comuni-
cación, pluralismo, concentración de 
audiencia, Estados Unidos, Unión Eu-
ropea.
1. Introduction1
1.1. Object of study
The defence and protection of pluralism (ideological, political, social, cul-
tural) in media systems is a basic principle in democratic countries. Indeed, 
it constitutes a key factor in the organisation and operation of the media, as 
contained in the postulates of normative theories on the democratic-liberal 
model2. According to Denis McQuail, the so-called ‘theory of press freedom’ 
or ‘classical liberal theory’ is based on freedom –of expression, of opinion, of 
information– as a legitimating principle of coexistence in the face of an irra-
tional, absurd control of information, which characterised the organisation of 
media models under authoritarian regimes.
1 The research and documentation for this article is part of the project “Pluralism and mul-
timedia groups in Spain: audience concentration” (CSO2008-01049) funded by the Ministry 
of Science and Innovation (Plan Nacional RDI 2009-2011). This project is directed by Carles 
Llorens, Ph.D., at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.
2 These theories have been compiled and formulated by Denis McQuail on the basis of various 
debates on and contributions to the operation and organisation of media systems in demo-
cratic countries. Cfr. McQUAIL, Denis, Mass Communication Theory. An Introduction, Sage, 
London, 1987.
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In the United States, after World War II, a debate emerged about the 
media’s social responsibility. This was a relevant reflection in view of the 
increasingly commercial nature of the media system, and it intended to put 
economic rights (freedom of enterprise, of the market and of private proper-
ty) on the same level as rights to freedom of expression, of the press and of 
information, understood as being a public service for the benefit of citizens. 
In other words, the media business should be compatible with the fulfilment 
of the media’s social duties and with the citizens’ legitimate aspiration to have 
access to free, rigorous and independent information. These ideas, which are 
condensed by McQuail3 in the so-called ‘theory of social responsibility’, de-
mand a social commitment from the media system to inform public opinion 
to enable it to choose freely from a range of options. Both democracy and 
pluralism once again.
Several decades later, at the height of the Cold War, new demands to 
improve the operation of democracy were made in the United States and 
democratic Europe: faced with a foreseeable bureaucratised model, in which, 
through the two-party system, the alternation of the main political parties 
sweetens parliamentary representation systems, the need to recover the es-
sence of democratic participation was considered, through a model encom-
passing the postulates of a broad social base, the expression of political and 
cultural diversity, and the contemplation of the legitimate aspirations of mi-
nority groups. According to McQuail4, that is how the so-called ‘democratic-
participant theory’ would develop, spurred on by cultural, social and political 
movements displaying their discontent with a democratic functioning that 
distances itself from the grassroots level and its foundations: respect for diffe-
rence, access to all options through the institutional public realm, the expres-
sion of ideas without the constraints of self-censorship and pressures from the 
powers that be. 
In short, the prolific normative debate that arisen out of the democratic-
liberal system concludes that the free confrontation of ideas through social 
communication mechanisms that shape –and are shaped by– the public realm, 
allows for the furtherance of knowledge of a reality –material and symbolic 
at one and the same time– on which ideas of progress and social welfare rest. 
Through a free, rational exchange of different points of view, the procure-
ment of agreement and consensus of a social and political nature becomes 
feasible, which in turn allows and facilitates the progress and development 
3 Ibídem.
4 Ibídem.
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of democracy. Hence the importance that the promotion and protection of 
pluralism acquires as a substantial element in democratic communication 
policies.
As a consequence, the design, development and application of commu-
nication policies in the United States and countries of the European Union 
place a great deal of importance on the defence of pluralism as an irrepla-
ceable cog in the democratic machinery of public opinion, as well as its con-
nection with the active defence of the right to information and freedom of 
speech. Both this need and this importance would become greater as a result 
of the international media system’s concentration, deregulation and globali-
sation, which gained pace in the early 1980s. Together with the technologi-
cal, liberalising and privatising thrust of Western democracies, a critical re-
view of today’s normative instruments on matters of defence and promotion 
of pluralism becomes necessary. 
1.2. Theoretical framework and methodology
The theoretical framework of this research project falls within the field 
of the Political Economy of Communication, the heir to a long tradition of 
critical studies and one that has become a useful tool for understanding the 
role of the media in today’s society, since it takes account of the changing 
quality of its object of study, as well as the intention to consider research 
from a realistic, inclusive and non-reductionist perspective5.
In fact, when studying the evolution of these media systems, a conflict 
arises between commercial and market dynamics on the one hand, and trends 
focusing more on educational, social and public service aspects on the other. 
This dialectic, the media’s and the cultural industry’s tendencies towards the 
marketisation and commercialisation of their content, and the transnationali-
sation of companies that shape the global communication structure have been 
key concerns in the field of Political Economy. Among this theory’s present-
day challenges and priorities, which have been analysed and systematised by 
zallo, there is a need for new approaches to and paradigms for cultural and 
communication strategies and policies that stress diversity and equality6. 
5 Cfr. MOSCO, Vincent, The Political Economy of Communication: Rethinking and Renewal, 
Sage, London, 1996. 
6 Cfr. zALLO, Ramón, “Retos actuales de la economía crítica de la comunicación y la cultu-
ra”, in ALBORNOz, Luis (comp.), Poder, medios, cultura. Una mirada crítica desde la economía 
política de la comunicación, Paidós, Buenos Aires, 2011, p. 40.
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Therefore, the objective of this proposal is to analyse the level of plura-
lism protection in American and European communication policies, taking 
account of the tensions (contained in the European Audiovisual Policy and 
in normative developments on communication in the United States) bet-
ween the economic level and the political-social level, as well as the need 
for balance between economic forces and interests and the articulation of 
democratic communication policies.
The study aims to describe and analyse the regulatory frameworks de-
fining the current pluralism protection policies in the United States and 
several countries of the European Union: in particular, the case studies re-
fer to Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and 
Spain. These countries were chosen because they provide examples of the 
three models –democratic, liberal and polarised pluralist– in the classifica-
tion put forward by Hallin and Mancini in their book Comparing Media Sys-
tems. Three Models of Media and Politics7. This allows data to be collected, 
through uniform parameters, on the specific application of these policies in 
each country, and a qualitative assessment to be carried out, through a com-
parative analysis, in order to highlight the most significant similarities and 
differences. Thus, it was concluded that pluralism protection is a common 
denominator in the communication policies of all these countries. However, 
there were found to be legal differences depending on social, geographical 
and media contexts, as were time variations in the application of policies 
depending on audiovisual media market liberalisation processes.
Thus, the study focuses on two transversal issues: the first refers to the im-
portance placed on pluralism protection in the afore-mentioned countries and 
the advent of pluralism regulation, and the second analyses the specific mea-
sures contemplated to ensure that pluralism is indeed protected and how such 
measures evolve, by paying particular attention to new trends: the relaxation 
of rules and regulations, and limits on audience concentration processes.
In order to attain these objectives, the article presents also the results of 
in-depth interviews with officials of independent audiovisual regulatory au-
thorities –mainly board members with an expertise in the area of pluralism– 
in five European Union countries and the United States: Conseil Supérieur 
de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) (France), Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzen-
tration im Medienbereich (KEK) (Germany), Autorità per le Garanzie ne-
lle Comunicazioni (Agcom) (Italy), Commissariaat voor de Media (CvdM) 
7 HALLIN, Daniel & MANCINI, Paolo, Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and 
Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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(Netherlands), Office of Communications (Ofcom) (United Kingdom) 
and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (United States).
The first main objective of the interviews, conducted between September 
2009 and April 2010, was to gather information from regulatory authorities 
about communication policies in the country, particularly those referring to 
the protection of pluralism and the existence of mechanisms that limit au-
dience concentration. To that end, the following sets of questions were posed:
1. General information about current legislation: What laws / basic re-
gulations shape communication policy in the country? Do you consider that 
communication policies currently applied in your country are uniform and 
well-structured, and that regulation covers all the constituent parts of the 
media system? If appropriate, what aspects / elements of the communication 
model lack regulation under current legislation?
2. Protection of pluralism under current legislation: What do you unders-
tand by pluralism? How could pluralism be defined on the basis of current 
legislation on this matter? What criteria were taken into consideration when 
defining pluralism? Does current legislation take account of “internal” plu-
ralism in the media, or does a notion based on “external pluralism” of the 
communication system prevail? Are there any laws guaranteeing political or 
ideological pluralism in your country’s media? Do you consider the protec-
tion of pluralism to be an important aspect of the country’s communication 
regulation? What are the main difficulties for designing / drafting regulations 
guaranteeing and protecting pluralism? 
3. Audience concentration as a pluralism regulating mechanism: Does the 
regulatory authority consider concentration to be a potential threat to diver-
sity and pluralism? If no such measures exist, are you considering including 
regulations to limit concentration? What criteria are applied to define exces-
sive media concentration or a dominant position in the communication mar-
ket? Was the criterion of audience concentration taken into account when 
regulating the defence of pluralism in the country’s communication system?
As a result of the qualitative analysis carried out on the interview results, 
we’ll explain how the creation, development, functions and objectives of in-
dependent regulatory authorities are directly linked to pluralism protection. 
In fact, the comparative study undertaken highlights that the promotion, 
control and monitoring of pluralism in the media system are not only some 
of the basic tasks of such authorities, but also their main reason for being8.
8 For further reading on issues connected with pluralism and concentration based on the 
same interviews, Cfr. ALMIRON, Núria et al., “Pluralism Protection and Regulatory Au-
POLíTICAS DE COMUNICACIÓN Y PROTECCIÓN DEL PLURALISMO EN LA UNIÓN EUROPEA Y ESTADOS UNIDOS
V
ol
. X
X
IV
 •
 N
º 
2 
   
   
 C
 y
 S
 •
 2
01
1
47
Numerous studies have been carried out previously on the connection 
between pluralism protection and concentration. Among others, the most 
noteworthy are reports by the Council of Europe9 –which has a long tradi-
tion of studies on pluralism– or those by the European Commission (report 
on the European regulatory situation published in 2007 or the proposal for 
key indicators to evaluate the risks to pluralism published in 200910). Plu-
ralism has also been a topic of concern for the European Parliament, which 
has set out its views on this issue in numerous resolutions and studies (one 
of the most interesting ones was produced by the European Institute for the 
Media11), and for other institutions such as the European Audiovisual Ob-
servatory (which recently assembled a compilation of regulation on media 
concentration in various European countries12).
Further compilations worthy of note are the studies carried out by the 
independent regulatory authorities of the United Kingdom13, France (‘the 
Lancelot report’14), the Netherlands15 and the United States (Federal Com-
munications Commission), with various empirical reports about concentra-
thorities in 5 Countries of the European Union and in the United States”, paper presented 
at the IAMCR Conference 2010 Communication and Citizenship, Braga, Portugal, 
July 2010.
9 Cfr. BRUCK, Peter A. et al., Transnational media concentrations in Europe, Council of Euro-
pe, Directorate General of Human Rights, Media Division, Advisory Panel on Media Diver-
sity, Strasbourg, 2004; WARD, David, The assessment of content diversity in newspapers and 
television in the context of increasing trends towards concentration of media markets. Final report on 
the study commissioned to Mr D. Ward by the MC-S-D, Council Of Europe - Group of Specialists 
on Media Diversity, Directorate General of Human Rights, Media Division, Strasbourg, 2006.
10 Cfr. EUROPEAN COMMISSION - DIRECTORATE-GENERAL INFORMATION SO-
CIETY AND MEDIA, Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States-
Towards a Risk-Based Approach, Brussels, 2009; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Media pluralism 
in the Member States of the European Union. SEC (2007), 32, Brussels, 16 January 2007.
11 Cfr. EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR THE MEDIA (EIM), Final report of the study on the 
information of the citizen in the EU: obligations for the media and the institutions concerning the 
citizen’s right to be fully and objectively informed, EIM, Düsseldorf, 2004.
12 Cfr. NIKOLTCHEV, Susanne (ed.), Television and Media Concentration. Regulatory models 
on the national and the European level, European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg, 2001. 
13 Cfr. OFCOM, Review of Media Ownership Rules, 2006.
14 Cfr. MINISTÈRE DE LA CULTURE ET DE LA COMMUNICATION, Rapport Lancelot: 
les problèmes de concentration dans le domaine des média, 2005, http://www.ddm.gouv.fr/IMG/
pdf/rapport_lancelot.pdf, accessed 30 January 2011; LLORENS, Carles, “The Lancelot Re-
port and the Debate on Media Pluralism and Concentration in France”, Quaderns del CAC, 
23-24, 2006, pp. 211-220.
15 Cfr. WARD, David, A mapping study of media concentration and ownership in ten European 
countries, Commissariaat voor de Media, Hilversum, 2004.
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tion. Academic contributions on the study of concentration and pluralism 
are also numerous16.
2. Advent of pluralism regulation and main regulatory trends
As pointed out, pluralism protection is one of the common denominators 
in all the countries included in the study, especially at a rhetorical level. 
Expressing it in specific measures, with the consequent establishment and 
development of a specific set of rules and regulations, is indeed much more 
complex. 
Thus, in a parallel fashion, each country has developed regulation that 
seeks to protect pluralism, both internal and external, mainly through anti-
trust limits. Each case is specific, but the trend identified relates to the deve-
lopment of the audiovisual media sector –and particularly with the liberalisa-
tion process insofar as external pluralism is concerned.
16 Cfr. IOSIFIDIS, Petros, “Pluralism and Concentration of Media Ownership: Measurement 
Issues”, Javnost the public, 17 (3), 2010, pp. 5-22; JUST, Natasha, “Measuring Media Con-
centration and Diversity: New Approaches and Instruments in Europe and the US”, Media, 
Culture and Society, 31, 2009, pp. 97-116; NOAM, Eli, Media Ownership and Concentration in 
America, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009; HARCOURT, Alison & PICARD, Rob-
ert, “Policy, Economic, and Business Challenges of Media Ownership Regulation”, Journal of 
Media Business Studies, 6 (3), 2009, pp. 1-17; DOYLE, Gillian, “Structure and Development 
of Media Ownership in Europe”, in HEINRICH. J. & KOPPER, G. (eds.), Media Econom-
ics in Europe, Vista, Dortmund, 2006, pp. 121-137; DOYLE, Gillian, Media Ownership, Sage, 
London, 2002; NAPOLI, Philip (ed.), Media Diversity and Localism: Meaning and Metrics, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, 2007; NAPOLI, Philip, “Audience Measure-
ment and Media Policy: Audience, Economics, the Diversity Principle, and the Local Peo-
ple Meter”, Communication, Law and Policy, 10 (4), 2005, pp. 349-382; BECERRA, Martín 
& MASTRINI, Guillermo, Periodistas y magnates. Estructura y concentración de las industrias 
culturales en América Latina, Prometeo, Buenos Aires, 2006; DWYER, Tim et al., Content, 
Consolidation and Clout: How Will Regional Australia Be Affected by Media Ownership Changes?, 
Communications Law Centre, Melbourne, 2006; GUSSE, Isabelle, Diversité et indépendance 
des médias, Pum, Montreal, 2006; BAKER, Edwin, Media concentration and democracy: why 
ownership matters, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006; ARIÑO, Mónica, “Competi-
tion Law and Pluralism in European Digital Broadcasting: Addressing the Gap”, Communica-
tions & Strategies, 54, 2004, pp. 97-128; LLORENS, Carles, “Media concentration”, Quaderns 
del CAC, 16, 2003, pp. 45-54; SáNCHEz-TABERNERO, Alfonso & CARVAJAL, Miguel, 
“Media Concentration in the European Market. New Trends and Challenges”, Media Markets 
Monographs, 3, 2002, pp. 1-163.
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Therefore, it was found that the United States, whose audiovisual media 
model has been private and commercial practically from the start17, centres its 
concerns on the allocation of frequencies –a scarce public asset– and dividing 
the territory into markets, with the specific objective of fostering diversity and 
localism through competition. Right from the start, these three concepts sig-
nalled the differences that would be found when comparing the United States 
to European countries: the geographical vastness of the country and its divi-
sion into federal states fuels the need to seek out ‘local’ differences, which are 
reflected in the defence of localism and not just diversity (not pluralism18); 
the consequent division into ‘markets’ (Designated Market Areas or DMAs); 
and finally, though by no means least, the trust placed in competition (and, 
implicitly, in private property and commercial funding) as the cornerstone 
of all media systems. Situated in this context, and since the approval of the 
Communication Act of 1934, several debates have arisen around the need to 
preserve diversity through limits on the ownership of radio and/or television 
stations. The first constraints emerged during the 1940s and 1950s, and were 
completed in the 1970s; these also extended to the press. 
In Europe, the first country to break the public broadcasting monopoly 
was the United Kingdom in the mid 1950s –significantly, it is one of the 
countries, alongside the United States, to be classified within the liberal 
model by Hallin and Mancini19. This led to legislation reflecting pluralism 
protection20. This was also expressed in limits on media ownership from the 
17 Cfr. SEGOVIA, Ana, “Organismos de regulación y control de las comunicaciones: el caso 
de la FCC”, Revista Latina de Comunicación Social, 64, 2009, pp. 526-539, http://www.re-
vistalatinacs.org/09/art/43_842_ULEPICC_15/52Segovia.html, accessed 2 February 
2011; SEGOVIA, Ana, “Aviso para navegantes. Concentración y privatización de las comu-
nicaciones en los Estados Unidos”, in QUIRÓS, Fernando & SIERRA, Francisco: Crítica de 
la Economía Política de la Comunicación y la Cultura, Comunicación Social Ediciones y Publi-
caciones, Sevilla, 2001.
18 This was one of the greatest conceptual difficulties when undertaking the comparative 
study of American and European communication policies. In the United States, the term 
‘diversity’ is used instead of ‘pluralism’, which undoubtedly introduces certain nuances when 
considering the country’s pluralism protection legislation and mechanisms. In our opinion, it 
is more in keeping with the meanings of the free market and the fostering of competition as a 
means of achieving it.
19 Ibídem.
20 From the time the 1954 Act was approved, it could be said that there was a twofold concern 
about pluralism. First, the Act severed the monopolistic power of the BBC: it conceived plu-
ralism as competition and, therefore, as external pluralism. Indeed, it defended the industry’s 
arguments, which rather were more liberal than democratic. Second, the new network of 
broadcasters that emerged, Independent Television (ITV), was heavily regulated as a Public 
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1990s, when liberalisation was extended –BSkyB and Five began operating 
in the British television market in 1990 and 1997, respectively. The Broad-
casting Act 1990 and especially the Broadcasting Act 1996 responded to ow-
nership concerns. 
Something similar happened in Spain: the need to respect pluralism was 
reflected in the first normative instrument on broadcasting, the Estatuto de 
Radio y Televisión de 1980. Specific regulation, with the first anti-trust limits, 
was applied to the development of the private radio market (Ley de Ordena-
ción de las Telecomunicaciones de 1987) and to the liberalisation of the televi-
sion market (Ley de Televisión Privada de 1988).
However, the expansion of the audiovisual media sector in other Euro-
pean countries, as was the case in Italy, France and Germany, led to anti-trust 
measures being taken not only in this sector, but also on press ownership. 
In Italy, concern for pluralism emerged following the decision taken by 
the Constitutional Court in 198121, which demanded legislation to protect 
pluralism. The decision should be understood as a reaction to governmental 
or legislative inaction in the light of the proliferation of pirate radio stations 
in the 1970s, the time when the current media magnate and Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s preference for the real estate business turned to 
the media business, with the acquisition –and transformation– of the cable-
TV station TeleMilano. An Act was not approved until 1990 (Legge 6 agosto 
1990, n. 223), which also become known as the ‘Polaroid Act’ because it was 
limited to ‘taking a snapshot’ of the situation that already existed, allowing a 
single operator to own 25% of national radio and television channels. Regar-
ding the press, Legge 25 febbraio 1987, n. 67, amending Legge 5 agosto 1981, n. 
416, established that no publishing company could control more than 20% 
Service Broadcaster (PSB) under the authority and supervision of the Independent Television 
Authority, renamed the Independent Broadcasting Authority under the Act liberalising radio 
in 1972. In addition, it had a specific mandate to reflect and broadcast the United Kingdom’s 
regional diversity from the start (Cfr. HUMPHREYS, Peter, Mass media and media policy in 
Western Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996, p. 131). Supervised thus by 
an independent authority, the public service spirit was transferred to commercial operators, 
and a concern for internal pluralism could also be seen in that approach. This gesture would 
mark media regulation in the United Kingdom, since even today the commercial operators 
ITV, Channel 4, S4C and Five are subject to public service duties, such as providing regio-
nal news services. One such duty is, “To make us aware of different cultures and alternative 
viewpoints, through programmes that reflect the lives of people and other communities both 
within the UK and elsewhere” (Public Service Purpose 4, defined in Ofcom’s Second Public 
Service Broadcasting Review: Putting Viewers First, 2009, p. 123).
21 Cfr. HUMPHREYS, Peter, Mass media and…, op. cit., p. 179.
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of daily press circulation. In the case of regional or interregional circulation, 
the percentage was raised to 50%.
When analysing the German case, it is first of all necessary to refer to 
article 5 of the Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz), which guarantees free-
dom of expression and freedom to receive information, both of which are 
fundamental to the creation of public opinion. Further, it explicitly mentions 
television broadcasting, indicating that for a commercial television system to 
exist, it is also necessary for a public service –guaranteeing a basic, universal 
service– to exist.
In addition, the Constitutional Court’s participation in pluralism regula-
tion is key in Germany, since it has determined that freedom of expression 
and freedom to receive information is not exclusively subjective. Rather, it 
is an objective guarantee and, to that end, it is necessary to ensure that the 
media system (broadcasting) functions properly. This means that a balanced 
diversity and plurality of content must be guaranteed, as must the oppor-
tunity for companies to participate in the market –without interfering in 
the media’s autonomy by doing so. On the basis of this interpretation by 
the Constitutional Court, broadcasting regulation includes measures to con-
trol the impact of media concentration on the formation of public opinion 
(Meinungsmacht) and to guarantee pluralism. Given that each Land has its 
own powers to regulate broadcasting, in 1991 the Länder decided to establish 
agreements with the force of law to avoid discoordination or significant di-
fferences between the measures adopted by each state. This agreement has 
been amended on numerous occasions to adapt it to the sector’s evolution. 
The last amendment (12th) came into effect in June 2009.
The normative instrument dealing with this issue is the Rundfunkstaatsver-
trag (RstV, Inter-State Broadcasting Contract/Agreement), which resorts to 
television audience reach as the criterion for analysing the market situation. 
Article 26 of the RstV stipulates that if a broadcaster, across all the channels 
on which it broadcasts (there is no limit on broadcast licence ownership), 
exceeds a mean annual audience of 30%, it must take the necessary measures 
to reduce its impact on public opinion. Furthermore, it establishes that if a 
company, across all of its stations, exceeds a mean annual audience of 25%, 
the competent authority (KEK) will proceed to assess whether, through its 
participation in important markets connected with broadcasting –and this is 
where the press and magazine sector appears, as do others such as television 
commercials and broadcast rights– that company has an impact on public 
opinion greater than 30%.
That is why the KEK (Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im 
Medienbereich) –created in 1997 by the third amendment of the RstV, the 
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objective of which was to have an independent regulatory institution to as-
sess the concentration of television broadcasting and associated markets– 
did not allow the Springer group (with a determining participation in the 
press and magazine market) to acquire the television stations of the bankrupt 
Kirch company.
In France, the fundamental Act for the daily press is Loi n 86-897 du 1 août 
1986. Portant réforme du régime juridique de la presse, which emerged after the 
liberalisation of the audiovisual media market had begun and shortly before 
one of France’s public television channels (TF1) had been privatised. This 
Act was approved to halt the control of national and regional printed press 
by a specific group, Groupe Hérsant Médias, which, in the 1980s, already 
boasted control over 30% of national printed press circulation, although the 
Act did not achieve its objective. In it, there are several stipulations about 
news transparency and the legal regime for printed press publishing compa-
nies. The most defining trait of this Act was the limit on circulation that it 
established for daily political and general news publications: a single owner is 
not allowed to accumulate more than 30% of the whole country’s circulation 
with publications of this type. Regarding the audiovisual media regime, the 
afore-mentioned Act was complemented by Loi nº 86-107 du 30 septembre 
1986 on the freedom of communication. Amended 50 times since then, with 
the latest amendment in 2009 (Ordonnance nº 2009-1019 du 26 août 2009 
portant extension et adaptation outre-mer des dispositions relatives à la télevision 
numérique terrestre), this is the fundamental Act for audiovisual media and 
the one that creates the CSA (Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel).
The definition of pluralism can be found in article 29 of the 1986 Act. 
Furthermore, on the basis of this Act, French legislation dealt with both 
external pluralism (limits on ownership, on the number of licences, on au-
dience reach and on audience) and internal pluralism. The importance that 
the CSA places on internal pluralism is reflected in one of its main reports 
on the topic, in which it defines pluralism exclusively in internal terms and 
stresses the ‘Principle of Political Pluralism’22. The CSA has applied this 
principle since 1 September 2009 to respect the plural expression of cu-
rrents of thought and opinion on radio and television. It is a quantitative 
principle that obliges channels to allocate the time spent on coverage of 
political actors in a specific way. To preserve the afore-mentioned internal 
pluralism, the CSA has the legal duty to deliver summaries of calculated 
22 Cfr. CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE L’AUDIOVISUEL, “Réflexions sur les modalités du plu-
ralisme”, 2006.
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coverage times to parliament every month. All of this points to the impor-
tance that the CSA places on the protection of internal pluralism (in fact, 
the committee charged with the matter is called ‘Pluralism and Electoral 
Campaigns’), although the defence of external pluralism can also be found 
among its functions23.
In the Netherlands, the concept of pluralism is linked to the public broad-
casting system. The public operator (Publieke Omroep) is formed by a main 
operator (Nederlandse Omroep Stichting or NOS), which is charged with 
generalist programming: news, sports broadcasts and major events, and a 
group of operators representing various aspects and traditions of Dutch socie-
ty. They all share the broadcast time of the three public television channels 
and six public radio stations. The NOS is an autonomous body of the Gover-
nment of the Netherlands, and it acts as the overall manager and coordinator 
of public service broadcasting. In addition, it has two independent arms: the 
NPS, a foundation that produces cultural content and content for minorities, 
and the STER, a body that manages advertising across all public channels. 
The rest of the operators broadcasting on public channels are civil-society 
private associations. This model of fostering pluralism in the media is based 
on placing public broadcasting in the hands of civil society, through associa-
tions that operate as broadcasters: any collective, legally organised as an asso-
ciation, can apply for a licence to obtain a certain number of broadcast hours 
on the public broadcasting system (depending on the number of members).
However, the processes of concentration and internationalisation that 
have taken place in the private media sector have given rise to some con-
cerns in the regulatory authority about the level of media concentration in 
the market and its impact on pluralism and the formation of democratic pu-
blic opinion: “In 2000, the Dutch Media Authority was given the new task 
of monitoring media concentration. Since 2002, the Mediamonitor of the 
Dutch Media Authority has published annual reports about the public infor-
mation supply with a specific focus on the effects of media concentration on 
the diversity and independence of that information”24. Furthermore, a Tem-
porary Act on Media Concentration was approved in 2007, which, in principle, 
was extended to 2012. However, it was repealed in late 2010 after the new, 
more liberal government came to power.
23 Cfr. ALMIRON, Núria, “Regulation of pluralism in France. Context, analysis and inter-
pretation”, Revista Latina de Comunicación Social, 65, 2011, pp. 472-487.
24 COMMISSARIAAT VOOR DE MEDIA, Mediamonitor. The Dutch Media in 2010, Hilver-
sum, 2011, p. 6.
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As a partial conclusion for this section, it should be noted that those 
countries expressing greater concern for internal pluralism in their rules are 
France and the Netherlands, although measures to protect it exist in every 
country analysed: for example, Italy’s Par Condicio law –applied to various 
programmes with political content– and the ‘equal time’ or ‘equal opportu-
nities provision’ in the United States –applied during electoral periods. In 
Germany, internal pluralism is only protected in measures such as the one 
stipulating that when a broadcaster focusing on news programme broadcasts 
exceeds a mean annual audience of 10%, it should reach an agreement, wi-
thin a period of six months, to offer part of its broadcast time to third parties; 
or when a broadcaster not focusing on news programme channels exceeds a 
mean annual audience of 20%, it should offer broadcast time to third parties 
in the channel of greatest importance in the market (Article 31 of the RstV).
3. New trends in the regulation of pluralism protection
Thus, it was found that the most generalised trend regarding the protec-
tion of pluralism –both external and, to a lesser extent, internal– is a de-
gree of relaxation and deregulation, which also extends to the constraints 
on cross-media ownership, which are becoming fewer and fewer. The other 
trend to which reference shall be made is the ever more frequent emergence 
of audience concentration as a technique to avoid concentration.
Regarding the first trend, the one connected with anti-trust measures, 
including cross-ownership, it is apparent in all the countries analysed. Once 
again, it was found that the American case leads the way, with the United 
Kingdom following a close second, since their respective deregulation phases 
began in the early 1980s; for the rest of the countries analysed, their respec-
tive deregulation phases began in the 1990s and particularly in the 2000s.
Some examples of the removal of constraints on concentration in the 
countries studied are given below:
• In the United States, the FCC began to have concerns about owners-
hip concentration shortly after it was created in 1934. Those concerns gave 
rise to a series of rules on both multiple and cross-ownership, which were 
basically developed in the 1940s, 1950s and 1970s. There was a break in this 
trend in the 1980s, firstly with changes relating to multiple ownership. The 
Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television 
Broadcast Stations set a limit of seven AM radio stations, seven FM radio sta-
tions and seven television broadcast stations. Effective as from 1953, it was 
amended by the 1984 Multiple Ownership Order, which raised the number 
to 12. In 1985, the FCC reconsidered its position. Realising that a simple 
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quantitative limit did not suffice, it established –for television only– a limit 
of 25% of audience reach for a single owner. Regarding cross-ownership, the 
FCC’s interest –from very early on– in fostering pluralism in similar coverage 
areas led it to set limits in this respect (referring to the ownership of several 
media in the same market). As a result, in 1970 it approved the one-to-a-
market rule, which banned the ownership of radio and television stations 
in the same market (although there are some exceptions). It went on to add 
press to the rule in 1975. From 1989, these rules have been dismantled, a pro-
cess that can be considered ongoing, since the 1996 Telecommunication Act 
obliges the FCC to review the established rules on ownership to determine 
whether they are still necessary for the purposes of competition and public 
interest. For example, the FCC released Notice of Inquiry (NOI) on 25 May 
2010 as part of the 2010 quadrennial review of its media ownership rules. In 
recent decades, the ownership of several radio networks, of several television 
networks, of radio and television networks, and radio/television plus press 
has gradually been permitted, even in the same market (DMA), depending 
its characteristics25.
• In the United Kingdom, as Humphreys26 points out, the Communica-
tions Act 2003: 
completed the incremental deregulation of media ownership rules con-
ducted by the Conservatives through the 1990s. In particular, their 1996 
Broadcasting Act, following a 1994–5 review of cross-media ownership, 
replaced the traditional approach of placing quite strict limits on accumu-
lations of interests within and between licensed television services with a 
new scheme based on a measurement of audience share that allowed for a 
considerable consolidation of the ITV sector.
The Broadcasting Act 1990 introduced limits on licence ownership and 
cross-ownership. For example, regarding licence ownership, it stipulated that a 
single operator could only have a national Channel 3, Channel 5 or national 
radio licence; two in the case of regional Channel 3 and 20 in the case of lo-
cal radio services. Regarding cross-ownership, it established mono-media and 
cross-media limits, both with a 20% rule. In the case of cross-ownership of 
25 Cfr. SEGOVIA, Ana, “Organismos de regulación…”, op. cit.; SEGOVIA, Ana, “Aviso 
para navegantes…”, op. cit.
26 HUMPHREYS, Peter, “Media Freedom and Pluralism in the United Kingdom (UK)”, in 
CzEPEK, Andrea, HELLWIG, Melanie & NOVAK, Eva (eds.), Press Freedom and Pluralism 
in Europe, Intellect, 2009, p. 206.
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printed press and electronic media, the 20% rule was also applicable. In 1996, 
the new Broadcasting Act introduced some considerable changes, such as set-
ting the market share (circulation for newspapers) and audience concentration 
(share for television) criteria. Limits on ownership were added to and combi-
ned with these criteria, so that, in the case of television, no single company 
could exceed 15% of the annual audience share. Public interest tests were also 
introduced for cross-ownership of newspapers and electronic media.
• In Germany, before establishing the limits mentioned in the previous 
section, there were more specific constraints on shareholdings in and owner-
ship of radio and television stations. Until 1996, no single owner could own 
more than 50% of a television channel with a licence to broadcast nationally 
or of a news channel, and could not be present in two or more television 
stations and in two or more radio stations. This limits were removed in the 
RstV ratified in autumn 1996, and a new control instrument was imposed: 
the limit on television audience concentration was set at a maximum of 30% 
of the national audience and, in some cases, at 25% if there was an important 
impact on public opinion27.
• In Spain, the liberalisation of the audiovisual media market set the first 
limits on ownership for the radio and television sector. The 1987 Act (Ley de 
Ordenación de las Telecomunicaciones de 1987) set some limits on radio station 
ownership, and the 2005 Act (Ley 10/2005) subsequently increased them. 
Regarding television, the first constraints on the percentage ownership of a 
channel increased from the initial 25% set in 1988 Act (Ley 10/1988 de Te-
levisión Privada) to 49% in 1998, only to be removed in 200228. In addition, 
in 2003 a percentage limit on shareholding (5%) was established to consider 
the illegality of holding shares in more than one licence-holding company. 
Moreover, the digital transition and the consequent increase in the number 
of television channels allowed one person or company to control up to two 
digital multiplexes (Real Decreto 1/2009, subsequently incorporated into the 
Ley General de Comunicación Audiovisual de 2010)29.
27 Cfr. LLORENS, Carles, La concentración de medios de comunicación y pluralismo: la acción de la 
Unión Europea, Doctoral Thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, 2001, p. 341.
28 Cfr. SEGOVIA, Ana, “Las contradicciones del sistema y los cambios legislativos en el 
ámbito comunicacional en España”, V ENLEPICC, Salvador de Bahia, 2005, http://www.
rp-bahia.com.br/biblioteca/pdf/AnaSegovia.pdf, accessed 2 February 2011.
29 Cfr. SEGOVIA, Ana & LUJáN, Luis, “Concentración y pluralismo en España ante el 
cambio digital”, AE-IC Congreso Comunicación y desarrollo en la era digital, Málaga, 2010, 
http://www.ae-ic.org/malaga2010/upload/ok/130.pdf.
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• In Italy, the rules and regulations on concentration have gradually been 
liberalised on the basis of limiting market concentration only. As pointed 
out earlier, audiovisual media legislation started with Legge 6 agosto 1990, 
n. 223, designed according to the needs of the media group controlled by 
Berlusconi. Thus, it set the limit at 20% “of the available resources for the 
entire media sector, including those for the print media, advertising, and the 
licence fee for the public broadcaster”30, specifying, in the case of television, 
that it was forbidden to own more than three national channels: exactly the 
number of channels operated by RAI and Fininvest. In 1994, the article in 
the Act referring to these ownership limits (Article 15.4) was declared un-
constitutional. As a consequence, a new Act was approved in 1997. Legge 
31 luglio 1997, n. 249, “set new anti-trust limitations forbidding national 
broadcasters from controlling more than 30% of the available resources in 
the television sector or utilizing more than 20% of the analogue national 
television channels”31, with the duty to transfer the exceeding channels to 
other platforms (satellite or cable). However, as Padovani clearly points out, 
it failed to set a deadline for the migration (that therefore never took place: 
Berlusconi’s return to power led to the approval of a new Act in line with his 
interests)32. The so-called ‘Gasparri Act’ (Legge 3 maggio 2004, n. 112) “esta-
blished that no single operator could access more than 20% of total available 
resources, but significantly enlarged the ‘relevant market’ out of which this 
percentage ought to be calculated […]”33, including printed press, electronic 
publishing, the Internet, radio and television, cinema… and even sponsoring 
and advertising. It should not be forgotten that the Testo unico de la Radiote-
levisione de 2005 set a deadline (21 December 2010) for one of the rules on 
cross-ownership of audiovisual media and the press. In particular, Art. 43.12 
stated that broadcasters that have more than one channel cannot buy shares 
in companies publishing daily newspapers or create new companies in the 
field of daily newspapers. In contrast, the limit on newspaper and television 
ownership was retained, which depended on the circulation reached in the 
30 PADOVANI, Claudia, “Pluralism of Information in the Television Sector in Italy: History 
and Contemporary Conditions”, in CzEPEK, Andrea, HELLWIG, Melanie & NOVAK, Eva 
(eds.), Press Freedom and Pluralism in Europe, Intellect, 2009, p. 296.
31 Ibídem.
32 Ibídem. In fact, a decision by the Constitutional Court in 2002 set the deadline for the 
transfer of a free-to-air channel to a pay-TV platform at 31 December 2003. However, a few 
days earlier, on 24 December, a decree issued by Berlusconi’s government annulled the duty 
imposed by the Court.
33 PADOVANI, Claudia, op. cit., p. 298.
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press market (Article 15 (1) Legge 6 agosto 1990, n. 223: A single publishing 
company holding more than 16% of the national circulation cannot hold 
any television licence. If the share is more than 8% of the national circula-
tion, then it can hold only one television licence. If the share is less than 8%, 
the company has the right to hold up to two licences).
• In the Netherlands, the first limits were set in 1988, when control of a 
maximum of 25% of press market circulation was permitted. The Temporary 
Act on Media Concentration, which became effective on 13 June 2007, was 
much more exhaustive, since it increased that percentage to 35% and relaxed 
the rules on cross-ownership: media groups could not have more than 35% of 
the press market. But if the three markets –press, radio and television– were 
taken as the reference, then a single limit of 90% out of a total of 300% was 
established. When a media group operated in two markets only, the limit was 
90% out of a total of 200%. These percentages were only applied to mergers 
and acquisitions, so they could effectively be greater if audiences increased as 
a result of the success of the content offered. However, this Act has recently 
been repealed and, therefore, these limits have disappeared, once again evi-
dencing the liberalising trend mentioned in the previous section.
• In France, anti-trust regulation is highly complex. The afore-mentioned 
1986 Act has undergone approximately 50 amendments in 25 years. Given 
that the French case sets audience concentration limits as a measure for en-
suring pluralism alongside ownership limits and other indicators, these shall 
be analysed in greater depth in the following section. Here, it is sufficient to 
point out that, in line with one of the latest amendments to the Act made in 
2009, a shareholder cannot own more than 49% of the share capital or vo-
ting rights in a national terrestrial television licence-holding company whose 
mean annual audience, for both analogue and digital broadcasts, exceeds 8% 
of the total television audience. The original Act did not allow participation 
in more than one licence but, later on, when the possibility of participating 
in several was introduced, 2.5% of the share was established as the limit34). 
Regarding the second of the trends, the ‘audience concentration’ criterion 
has gradually been introduced into regulation for the defence and protection 
of pluralism. Thus, since the 1980s, this criterion has gradually given rise to 
legislation in the countries studied: the United States in 1985, Germany in 
1991 and the United Kingdom in 1996 –subsequently amended35. A little 
34 Cfr. LLORENS, Carles, “The Lancelot Report and…”, op. cit. 
35 Since 2003, the potential audience criterion has only been applied indirectly to studies of 
local radio concentration.
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later, other countries incorporated this criterion: France in 2000, the Nether-
lands in 2007 and Spain in 2009, among others. Before continuing, it is im-
portant to distinguish between three different audience concepts: ‘audience 
share’ is the percentage of television audience watching a particular program-
me at a given time; ‘audience reach’ is the percentage of population watching 
a particular programme at a given time; ‘potential audience’ is the percentage 
of population able to watch a particular programme at a given time.
More space shall be given over to the German case, since its main crite-
rion for pluralism protection is specifically referred to this issue (television 
audience reach for analysing the market situation and determining the do-
minant position of broadcasters on public opinion). Control over television, 
and not other media, is justified by its suggestive capacity, its reach (broad-
cast) and its capacity to provide live information (news). As pointed out in 
the previous section, Article 26 of the RstV establishes a maximum percen-
tage for the mean annual audience (30% share) and, should that figure be 
exceeded, the measures that need to be taken to avoid an undue impact on 
public opinion. 
The measures are applied with the consensus of broadcasting companies 
and the KEK, the commission responsible for controlling media concentra-
tion. Three measures are contemplated:
1. To force broadcasting companies to divest operations to ensure that the 
audience for their channels as a whole is lower than 30%.
2. To force important media-related markets to divest operations to redu-
ce their impact on public opinion.
3. To offer part of their broadcast time to third parties (Article 31) or 
to create a programming advisory board (Programmbeirat) comprising repre-
sentatives of relevant social groups to oversee programming diversity and 
plurality (Article 32).
To assess mean annual audience, certain discounts are made if broadcas-
ters apply the following measures to guarantee diversity and pluralism:
1. If they have regional programming windows that have territorial auto-
nomy, a 2% discount is made.
2. If they free-up broadcast time so that third parties (broadcasters) can 
broadcast their content, a 3% discount is made.
If the afore-mentioned percentages are exceeded and an investigation 
is launched to assess the impact of a company / media group / broadcaster 
on public opinion, the company or companies involved cannot apply for a 
new television licence and cannot make any changes to their shareholdings. 
However, even if they have not reached the afore-mentioned percentages, 
the KEK may decide to launch an investigation –after a request to do so by 
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an independent regulatory authority– if it considers that there is a threat to 
public opinion.
For its part, Article 27 of the RstV specifies that, to calculate the mean 
annual audience, only German-language television channels shall be taken 
into account. This issue has become a topic of debate due to the importance 
of some foreign-language channels. Article 28 of the RstV sets minimums of 
25% for shareholdings and voting rights to ascertain whether a broadcaster 
belongs to a company or media group, thus enabling it to be included in the 
calculation of its mean annual audience. Article 29 of the RstV establishes 
that all shareholding changes must be communicated to the KEK, which will 
issue an assessment of them.
In the case of France, legislation introduces a mechanism for audiences 
with the aim of nuancing and complementing the limitations and defects of 
the anti-trust rules and regulations, which are based solely on the ownership 
(capital) of companies and the number of licences granted. On this issue, the 
French regulatory authority contemplates the following: 
Indeed, the strengthening, by law, of provisions formulated in terms of 
potential or real audience share, or business turnover share of the various 
markets, would offer the advantage of bringing the French system closer 
to systems applied by its various European partners and, above all, would 
prove to be better suited to market evolutions36.
To establish media concentration levels, factors such as the concentra-
tion of capital, licences, population and audiences are taken into account 
(circulation in the case of printed press). Each of these elements has a pro-
tection mechanism by law37.
The audience concentration criterion used in France is potential audien-
ce. The main disadvantage lies in calculation and control difficulties or, in 
other words, how audiences can be reliably measured and controlled in all 
media. To overcome this defect, potential audience is the criterion that helps 
to complete the rest of the indicators applied: it is considered to be another 
criterion, but not the most important one. The CSA understands that the 
mechanisms limiting potential audience and audience reach are complemen-
tary, the main ones being ownership and licences; combining them all leads 
36 CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE L’AUDIOVISUEL, “Le CSA, le pluralisme et la concentra-
tion des médias”, La Lettre, nº 185, 2005, http://www.CSA.fr/actualite/dossiers/dossiers_de-
tail.php?id=27758&chap=2641, accessed 30 January 2011.
37 Loi nº 86-107 du 30 septembre 1986 relative à la liberté de communication.
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to an increase in the level of guarantees. However, this combination of cri-
teria makes things very complex. The reason lies in legal consistency. As 
stated by Almiron38, “Given that since 1986 the law has undergone about 50 
amendments, it should be noted that the current legal text, due to its length 
and multiple additions, is susceptible to multiple interpretations, as it is com-
plex and contradictory”.
In the Netherlands, the specific and temporary legal framework applied 
to media concentration was repealed in late 2010 and, as a consequence, 
the few limits that existed on media group ownership and annual audien-
ce percentages disappeared. The Temporary Act on Media Concentration was 
approved in 2007 with the aim of measuring pluralism and the level of media 
concentration through annual studies (Mediamonitor), which were delive-
red to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. This Act relaxed the 
rules on cross-ownership and commissioned the analysis of the evolution of 
mergers and the financial control of the media market’s economic conditions 
to the Commissariaat voor de Media (CvdM).
Regarding audience concentration, there were few –and indirect– refe-
rences, since the afore-mentioned legislation considered all three media ty-
pes equally, with no weighting depending on the proportion of the markets. 
Thus, the mean audience for a media group was calculated on the basis of the 
totalling percentage audience share in each of the markets: television, radio 
and press. Nor was the increased use of media such as the Internet or mobile 
television considered.
The Dutch Audience Research Foundation measures the calculation me-
thod for mean audience share for television, and its partner organisation does 
the same for radio listening. The method was to add the percentage devoted 
to channels of a particular supplier of the total time devoted to television 
watching (radio listening) in a year. The market share is measured on the 
level of title/channel, and all titles/channels are later aggregated on the level 
of the supplier (e.g. RTL4 + RTL5 + RTL7 = total audience share for supplier 
RTL). For newspapers there are no audience share measures, only reach per 
title (not time spent reading). Therefore, circulation is used to determine the 
audience share. The reach of each title is used just for monitoring purposes39.
38 ALMIRON, Núria, “Regulation of pluralism in France. Context, analysis and inter-
pretation”, Revista Latina de Comunicación Social, 65, 2011, pp. 472-487, http://www.
revistalatinacs.org/10/art3/913_Pompeu/35_AlmironEN.html, accessed 30 January 2011.
39 These data were obtained from questions put to representatives of the Commissariaat voor 
de Media (CvdM).
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Given the characteristics detailed in section two, a particular feature 
in the United States is legislation based on differences between markets or 
DMAs. Thus, since 1985, it has taken account of constraints on television 
station ownership both quantitatively and qualitatively. In other words, the 
potential audience that could be reached (the percentage was initially set at 
25%, then increased in 1996 to 35% and increased again to the current 39%) 
is added to the numerical limit –which will end up disappearing40. 
Likewise, the limits based on real audience are only taken into conside-
ration at very specific times and when the market fulfils a number of specific 
characteristics with respect to the number of existing voices and media. For 
example, a television duopoly is permitted in markets where at least eight in-
dependently owned and operating commercial or non-commercial full-power 
broadcast television stations would remain in the market after the combina-
tion, taking into account that at least one of the stations in the combination 
is not ranked among the top four stations in terms of audience share. And, 
in the case of cross-ownership of press and audiovisual media, certain specific 
conditions have to be met, such as: when a daily newspaper seeks to combine 
with a radio station in a top 20 designated market area (DMA), or when a daily 
newspaper seeks to combine with a television station in a top 20 DMA and (1) 
the television station is not ranked among the top four stations in the DMA 
and (2) at least eight independent ‘major media voices’ remain in the DMA41.
It is therefore possible to see how, in this country, the audience concen-
tration criterion is applied to avoid dominant positions in the different local 
markets or DMAs.
In Spain, as already mentioned, the 1988 Act (Ley 10/1988 de Televisión 
Privada) was the central axis of the policy to protect television pluralism 
through the diversity of ownership. The latest amendment relaxing owner-
ship constraints, made by Royal Decree in 200942 –and which subsequently 
40 The 210 markets that currently exist have a percentage assigned to them depending on 
the population they cover, which is the one added for the purposes of potential audience (for 
example, the New York market, situated in first place, is the equivalent of just over 6.5%, 
whereas Denver is 1.3%).
41 A ‘major media voice’ includes full-power commercial and non-commercial television sta-
tions and major newspapers. In the latest review of the rules on ownership, the Commission 
concluded that such sources are generally the most important and relevant outlets for news 
and information in local markets. Cfr. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 
Quadrennial Review Order, 2006, http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/2006-rules.html, acces-
sed 5 March 2011. 
42 Real Decreto-ley 1/2009, de 23 de febrero, de medidas urgentes en materia de telecomunicaciones.
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became an Act, also introduced the new trend referred to as ‘audience con-
centration’, since it allowed state-wide licence-holding television service 
companies to merge when the mean audience of their channels as a whole 
was lower than 27% of the total audience over the 12 consecutive months 
prior to an acquisition. With this change, there was a shift from a system 
based on limiting ownership concentration to a system based on state-wide 
audience concentration, since the constraints remained in force both regio-
nally and locally43. 
For its part, the United Kingdom introduced audience concentration as 
a limit very early on, in 1996 legislation. Thus, among other constraints on 
television, this legislation established that if an operator reached 15% of the 
annual audience share, it could not have two or more licences for Channel 
3 and 5, satellite or digital services. Neither could it exceed 20% of the sha-
reholding in two or more operators owning licences for these services, nor 
own a licence and have a shareholding of more than 20 % in other opera-
tors. In the case of radio, the 15% limit was applied in relation to a system 
of points awarded in accordance with the potential audience (no-one alone 
could have two or more licences to which more than 15% of the total points 
in a specific area could be attributed). For cross-ownership, a 20% rule was 
followed, in the same way as for television. If an owner of a national news-
paper controlled at least 20% of the market, then that owner could not have 
a licence for Channel 3 or 5, national or local radio, or exceed 20% of the 
shareholding in a national or regional Channel 3 service or in Channel 5.
All of these provisions were mostly eliminated by the Communications 
Act 2003 and by the Digital Economy Act 2010, since the constraints based 
on television audience share were removed and only some of the constraints 
on cross-media ownership (newspapers and television) were retained. In the 
case of local markets, the 2010 Act empowered Ofcom to develop proposals 
that the regulator had put forward in November 2009: to remove constraints 
on radio concentration, only leaving the constraints on press, radio and tele-
vision cross-ownership. 
Following the pressure exerted by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, which came to power in 2010, Ofcom pronounced 
that it was in favour of removing the final constraint, claiming that plu-
43 Cfr. LLORENS, Carles, “Spain’s Media Concentration Policy: A Patchwork Crucial to the 
Understanding of the Spanish Media System”, International Journal of Communication, vol. 4, 
2010, pp. 844-864, http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/791/462, accessed 30 
January 2011.
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ralism, although it would be limited, would ultimately be compensated by 
the BBC’s regional stations and by the new local television stations that the 
government wanted to promote44.
Finally, in Italy, as pointed out, the constraints are applied on the basis 
of concentration understood basically as ‘market concentration’ and not in 
terms of audience.
Therefore, ‘audience concentration’ is generally understood as an as-
sessment criterion and/or a political criterion. For the countries analysed in 
the study, it emerges as a highly important criterion in Germany, and is used 
in combination with other criteria in France. However, in the Netherlands, 
Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, it is used either restricti-
vely or very restrictively –and not at all in Italy45.
4. Regulatory authorities’ assessments
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, one of the fundamental 
objectives and the main reason why independent regulatory authorities exist 
is to promote, control and monitor pluralism in the media system. Howe-
ver, the interviews conducted with the representatives of these institutions 
overwhelmingly showed that dissatisfaction and scepticism prevailed when it 
came to assessing their tasks.
This dissatisfaction may be connected with the lack of powers to set the 
limits that they have to apply, or with the lack of effectiveness due to the 
fact that their decisions can be overturned, vetoed or annulled, depending 
on the case. Another important aspect mentioned in the interviews is that 
they operate within legal frameworks that are subject to change, thus making 
it difficult to maintain a certain degree of consistency in the application of 
pluralism protection policies.
In the United States for example, representatives of the FCC (Federal 
Communications Commission) mentioned the uncertainty arising from 
the implementation of a number of measures because, and particularly so 
in recent years, the commission’s decisions have ended up being settled in 
44 The Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) included deregulation as one of the 
key points of the proposal to reform the media regulatory regime (see Section 3 of the document 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/SRP_DCMS_150710.pdf, accessed 15 March 
2011. This reform included the Spending Review submitted in October 2010 by the coalition 
government to cut the national debt, and it also included a complete overhaul of Ofcom.
45 Cfr. ALMIRON, Núria et al., “Pluralism Protection and Regulatory Authorities…”, op. cit. 
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the courts. The Telecommunication Act of 1996 stipulates that regulation 
should be reviewed periodically to ascertain whether it is still necessary. In 
these reviews, the main problem is how to quantify the level of pluralism, and 
the fundamental concern is market concentration.
The FCC is responsible for concentration regulation, but Congress can 
intervene and approve additional measures or amendments. From the inter-
view conducted, it became clear that the FCC recognises that media con-
centration has increased in the last 10-15 years. However, the interviewees 
added that the situation would be worse without the current regulation.
The problems underscored in Italy are related to internal coordination, 
which also tends to diminish the effectiveness of approved rules and measu-
res. Agcom (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Communicazioni) is the public 
body responsible for monitoring the media and telecommunications, though 
it does not have the power to regulate or establish measures to protect and 
promote pluralism. Consequently, while it has never made any proposals on 
regulating media concentration, it has indeed done so in other areas, such as 
the proposal to make the sanctioning procedure more efficient. 
Contrary to the preconceived idea of “legislative chaos”, the interviewees 
asserted that the criteria for measuring media concentration are now very 
detailed, and that rules are now in place regarding the procedure that needs 
to be followed. In addition, Agcom has commissioned the compilation and 
systematisation of media industry data from 1999, an operation that the au-
thority itself has been performing since 2002.
In Germany, the commission for the control of media concentration 
(KEK, Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich) 
acts at the request of each Land’s independent regulatory authorities of the 
media. Its decisions are binding, though they can be vetoed by the KDLM 
(Conference of Directors of State Regulatory Authorities) by a three quarters 
majority. The subordination of both issues has become one of the main topics 
of debate in the KEK, which demands greater autonomy and power to take 
initiatives to improve its effectiveness.
In the case of Germany, the main critical element that the interviewees 
underscored was the regulatory authority’s political dependence and lack of 
operational power. According to the assessments gathered, the protection 
and defence of pluralism is very important in Germany, and such issues are 
actually enshrined in its Constitution. Communication law also focuses on 
the promotion of pluralism to a considerable extent. In fact, this regulatory 
authority was specifically created to control pluralism connected with media 
concentration and the impact of the latter on public opinion. Regarding futu-
re challenges, its members identified the following main topics as issues that 
JUAN JOSÉ BAS, ANA I. SEGOVIA, CARLES LLORENS, NÚRIA ALMIRON, HELENA P. GRAU Y ROBERTO SUáREz CANDEL
V
ol
. X
X
IV
 •
 N
º 
2 
   
   
 C
 y
 S
 •
 2
01
1
66
need to be resolved in the coming years: giving the KEK powers to sanction, 
improving the provision of and access to data in order to effectively control 
concentration, and enhancing effectiveness when it comes to identifying a 
company or companies that is or are actually dependent on a broadcaster.
Regarding the elaboration of regulation, representatives of the KEK felt 
that greater administrative robustness and determination were required, gi-
ven the relationships and links that are often forged among media groups and 
political parties or regional governments. It is also very complex and difficult 
to control or even limit the growth of media groups while simultaneously 
aiming to ensure that they remain competitive in the international arena. 
However, most of the difficulties lie in its effective application: for example, 
they underscored the complexity of effectively controlling relationships bet-
ween companies and ascertaining the composition of a media group.
The French regulatory authority is called the Conseil Supérieur de 
l’Audiovisuel (CSA), which has a political pluralism and electoral campaig-
ns committee. Members of the CSA asserted that, in the body’s evolution, 
pluralism regulation has been its reason for being and its main function. 
The defence and protection of pluralism are, therefore, priority objectives 
in French communication regulation. In a second phase, cultural and social 
aspects are regulated, as is the protection of vulnerable audiences, while fi-
nancial and technological regulation is the third phase. The pluralism that 
the CSA defends is defined as the protection of an intermediate state located 
between the channels’ freedom of communication and the obligation to ob-
serve established rules.
Besides legal issues, other criteria for defining pluralism were mentioned 
in the interview, such as giving preference to new actors entering the market, 
giving priority to candidates with links to local communities, and guarantee-
ing internal pluralism by offering the highest possible number of opinions. 
Reference was also made to technology as the main difficulty related to plura-
lism protection. For example, on the Internet, there are websites that publish 
electoral polls in advance of the legally established time, and some journalists 
use the Internet as a source of information without comparing and contras-
ting it, since they are subject to the dictates of the now and the immediate.
The abundance and complexity of legislation on the matter was also un-
derscored as an obstacle to pluralism. The main contradiction that can be 
found in the CSA is that, on the one hand, it aims to control media groups 
to prevent concentration –the Socialist party in opposition even speaks of 
completely disassociating media groups from other industrial interests– and, 
on the other, it aims to create strong French media groups that are able to 
compete internationally. 
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In the United Kingdom, external pluralism shapes the basic doctrine of 
Ofcom (Office of Communications), though internal pluralism can also be 
found in its self-regulation codes, which establish due impartiality and rigour 
in the media, especially on public issues or matters of political and economic 
debate. While authority for designing and elaborating drafts to regulate plu-
ralism in the media falls to the government, in the interview conducted, the 
introduction of a more flexible mechanism was positively highlighted; that of 
reviewing the rules from time to time on the basis of Ofcom reports in order 
to keep up with the pace of change. 
As a pluralism regulation mechanism, Ofcom officials acknowledged that 
the use of ownership concentration criterion was useful because it falls wi-
thin the scope of the regulator, though they pointed to several problems that 
the criterion throws up: it is not sufficient to measure other types of con-
centration, such as information sources and the degree of independence of 
editorial control.
From the interview, it became clear that there are two parallel debates in 
the United Kingdom: the debate on deregulation and the debate on public 
service broadcasting. Regarding deregulation, it was felt that some degree of 
deregulation was necessary because the market is better placed to provide 
consumers with a variety of services. Regarding public service broadcasting, 
the assumption is that the market alone cannot ensure sufficient supplies of 
public service content to meet the needs of United Kingdom citizens and, 
as a result, several options are included to guarantee such content, as well as 
content of a local and regional nature: the survival of local television servi-
ces or a new alternative, proposed by Ofcom, which would include indepen-
dently-funded news consortia (IFNCs). 
The Dutch regulatory authority, the Commissariaat voor de Media 
(CvdM), places greater importance on external pluralism –the variety of op-
tions and offerings in public and commercial broadcasting– than on internal 
pluralism. Regarding the assessments made in the interview, worthy of note 
is the defence of the concept of political pluralism generated by the public 
broadcasting system, which guarantees civil society’s access to the media on 
the one hand, and the expression of their ideas on the other.
According to the interviewees’ statements, they did not come up against 
any particular difficulties when designing and elaborating rules on media 
concentration and pluralism, although they felt that agreements should be 
entered into with operators in order to develop and implement the new re-
gulation. Also taken into account were new debates arising in the European 
Union, such as the size or the funding of the public broadcasting system, or 
the level of competition between public and commercial broadcasting. The 
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CvdM is now working towards developing and implementing rules applicable 
to online media and the Internet.
In the Netherlands, pluralism protection is considered to be a principal 
aspect of media legislation and of communication policy application. Re-
garding concentration, these policies were strengthened in 2000 following 
the Mediamonitor reports produced by the CvdM and the approval of the 
Temporary Act on Media Concentration (2007), which allowed the various 
media markets and the processes of acquisitions and mergers between media 
groups to be controlled (as mentioned earlier, this Act has recently been 
repealed).
5. Conclusions
As outlined in the presentation, this article describes and analyses the 
regulatory frameworks and the current pluralism protection policies in the 
United States and several countries of the European Union (Germany, Fran-
ce, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain). The data obtai-
ned allow a qualitative assessment to be carried out, through comparative 
analysis, in order to identify certain similarities and some significant differen-
ces. Thus, it was found that pluralism protection is a common denominator 
in the communication policies of these countries. However, regulatory and 
legislative differences depend on social, geographical and media contexts, 
and time variations in the application of policies depend on audiovisual me-
dia market liberalisation processes.
5.1. Differences in legal frameworks
Despite the fact that European countries share common directives issued 
by European Union institutions and should transpose those directives into 
their national legislations, differences in the rules regulating basic aspects 
of the media system prevail; such is the case for pluralism. Greater concern 
for external pluralism was found in some cases: Germany, France and Spain, 
which take audience reach very much into account as an assessment crite-
rion –especially the first two; and for internal pluralism in others: France, 
the Netherlands and Italy are countries that express the defence of internal 
pluralism in their rules and regulations. There are also differences in the or-
ganisation, composition, powers, functions and sanctioning abilities of the 
regulatory authorities analysed. As a result, a uniform approach to the defen-
ce of the value of pluralism is still a long way off.
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It is therefore difficult to establish any uniform criteria for pluralism pro-
tection in the countries studied, since the globalisation of phenomena affec-
ting the media model (for example, the threat that business concentration 
processes represent for the diversity of opinions and points of view in the 
media) is not accompanied by a response –which could also be global– by 
democratic communication policies.
5.2. Differences in perceptions, traditions and use of language
Another significant difference lies in the values used in and applied to 
the design of the rules and regulations analysed: political culture, social cus-
toms and traditions, different legal traditions, political approaches and even 
language generate a wide diversity of options when it comes to dealing with 
the topic of pluralism. For example, in the United States, the term ‘diver-
sity’ –rather than pluralism– is used, since, in that country’s legislation on 
communication, greater importance is placed on localism, therefore taking 
account of available voices and media in each market. In Europe, there is a 
historical concern to control the dominant position of media groups (ideolo-
gical, political) and to foster the democratic formation of public opinion. In 
this respect, it was found that audience concentration criteria are beginning 
to be applied as a pluralism protection mechanism.
However, there is a transversal element in almost every country: the 
judiciary’s intervention in order to give legitimacy to and interpret the rules 
of pluralism. Thus, for example, the judiciary in Italy has been involved in 
driving forward legislation on pluralism protection; in Germany it has played 
a key role in interpreting the law; and in the United States it has settled 
conflicts between the regulatory agency and other actors, even overturning 
some of the decisions or regulations approved by the FCC (Prometheus Ra-
dio Project v. FCC, 2004).
Also worthy of note is the difference between the audiovisual media mo-
del of the United States (private and commercial practically from the start, 
with very little implantation of public radio and television as a result) and 
the dual audiovisual media model of European Union countries (public and 
private). Besides the national particularities, the existence of public televi-
sion in Europe situates the terms of the debate on pluralism on a different 
level. Thus, the defence of internal pluralism, a classic criterion applied in 
Europe to both public and private media, has given way to a new criterion: 
public media must provide an environment for diversity and private media 
create an environment for competition. Thus, the democratic value of plura-
lism now tends to be identified with the concept of external pluralism, which 
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in turn confuses the coexistence of two voices –public offering and private 
offering– with the existence of a diversity of voices. 
5.3. Impermanence: legal framework subject to review
The media sector’s link to the productive economy, its need to adapt and 
change to keep up with technology, and its marked dependence on political, 
social and cultural circumstances and junctures all together make the norma-
tive framework regulating the media a very fertile ground for impermanence. 
The large number of factors and interests that intervene in the regulation 
of the media means that de facto situations prevail over logic, rationality, 
forecasts and certain anticipated visions when it comes to legislating on such 
matters. The different political and economic situations in each country the-
refore explain why there is such a variety in the cases analysed. In nearly all 
of them, it was found that changes are being made; some have recently been 
implemented (Spain) or are in the process of being debated (United States), 
while others are subject to temporary regulations (Netherlands). Pluralism 
protection policies therefore tend to follow the general communication poli-
cy trend: regulation and legislation is made on the basis of a changing reality 
that, in turn, forces the rules to be amended. As a result, it was found that 
there are difficulties in implementing effective long-term measures and plan-
ning political action that is consistent with democratic postulates.
5.4. The relationship between the advent of pluralism protection and audiovisual 
media market liberalisation
In relation to the above, another conclusion that could be drawn is that 
there are close links between the advent of pluralism protection policies and 
audiovisual media market liberalisation processes rolled out in the countries 
analysed. Thus, the privatisation and concentration of media ownership or 
the transnationalisation of capital and financial flows have given rise to a 
political response that basically tries to halt to situations of dominant power 
that certain media groups may exert over markets, content and public opi-
nion. It is mostly in that respect that the defence of pluralism emerges; pro-
tection mechanisms are used to guarantee free, democratic public opinion, 
one that is shaped by competing points of view. The clearest example of this 
link between the limits on concentration and guaranteeing free public opi-
nion is the German case, where audience reach is specifically used to prevent 
a single media group from exerting a dominant influence over society.
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5.5. Regulatory authorities have a certain degree of organic dependence on gover-
nments (difficult to avoid, i.e. via funding or member election)
The degree and level of independence that regulatory authorities have 
is another key issue when it comes to assessing policies aimed at fostering 
pluralism, since the circumstances and junctures affecting political power 
can occasionally interfere in the decisions taken on pluralism or in the prac-
tical application of pluralism in each of the countries. Despite legal cautions 
that try to impede the politicisation of these organisations, the mechanisms 
for electing and/or appointing chairpersons and members to them involve 
a more or less direct intervention by the respective government and/or par-
liament. Thus, it is a complicated matter to separate the development and 
application of pluralism policies from political toing and froing and par-
liamentary debate. This situation becomes even more complicated when 
there is a lack of any basic consensus among a country’s political forces to 
approve and drive forward such policies –the Spanish case, for example– or 
when partisan criteria are clearly present in such policies –the Italian case, 
for instance. 
5.6. Difficulties reconciling pluralism as a socio-democratic value and concentra-
tion as a threat to economic/market expectations
The analysis of indicators used to measure levels of pluralism suggests, 
by way of a conclusion, that account should be taken of both economic and 
socio-political aspects. Thus, pluralism protection as a democratic principle 
may come into conflict with economic principles based on the free market 
and competition. The dichotomy between internal pluralism and external 
pluralism, together with a greater emphasis placed on the latter concept by 
the policies analysed, indicates that the dominant trend consists in identi-
fying a greater quantity of voices available (a large number of media) with 
a higher level of diversity and pluralism. Thus, protecting the market logic 
protects pluralism: if the markets functions, it provides diversity.
However, this argument conflicts with concentration processes and the 
dominant position –in relation to public opinion– of certain media groups in 
national and international markets. Thus, the emergence of limits based on 
audience reach as a mechanism is significant in the sense that it will need to 
be explored, tested and improved in years to come. Therefore, the previous 
argument should be nuanced: a functioning market cannot always provide 
diversity. In view of this eventuality, a democratic society must have and 
demand guarantees.
JUAN JOSÉ BAS, ANA I. SEGOVIA, CARLES LLORENS, NÚRIA ALMIRON, HELENA P. GRAU Y ROBERTO SUáREz CANDEL
V
ol
. X
X
IV
 •
 N
º 
2 
   
   
 C
 y
 S
 •
 2
01
1
72
The analysis of pluralism protection policies shows that a muddle and/or 
some confusion has developed between these two aspects: on the one hand, 
there are industry pressures and, on the other, (good or bad) political inten-
tions and pragmatism in the light of consummate facts. The industry’s views 
and arguments are well known: the market provides diversity, internal plu-
ralism should prevail, external pluralism is not important if there is internal 
pluralism, etc., and faced with that, it is necessary to rely on the design and 
effectiveness of communication policies that countries apply, to a lesser or 
greater extent, in order to halt economic concentration and dominant posi-
tions in the sector.
Nor does it appear reasonable to abandon the defence and application 
of internal pluralism in either the public or private media sectors. In fact, in 
those countries (France and Italy) where the partisan struggle has been much 
more pronounced and unstable, it was found that there is a trend towards 
establishing highly regulated pluralism protection mechanisms.
Irrespective of whether or not the market functions and provides a smaller 
or larger number of options and voices, what underlies the democratic prin-
ciple of pluralism is the social benefit stemming from the use of the public 
realm as a place for encounter and consensus. However, the solution does not 
consist in imposing a policy that regulates content –in fact, historical exam-
ples have shown this to be ineffective46, but rather in promoting a culture of 
diversity and dialogue through the media. Thus, for example, the legislators 
and regulatory authorities are mired in various dilemmas: they have to smoo-
th out tensions and conflicts between public and private bodies, and above 
all, they have to come up with anti-trust measures that do not jeopardise 
national groups that need to expand beyond their borders47.
It is clear that the greatest challenge facing the development and applica-
tion of pluralism protection policies lies in the fit and difficult balance bet-
ween social values and economic values, that is to say, between democratic 
criteria and market criteria.
46 This is the case, for example of the ‘fairness doctrine’ in the United States, which was 
removed in 1987.
47 This situation was made explicitly clear in the interviews conducted with experts from the 
KEK and the CSA. 
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